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Chapter 1: Introduction 
  
 The end of World War II led to the creation of the United Nations (UN), which 
brought with it the creation of a peacekeeping system and peacekeeping force based 
around the decision-making of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). This paper 
seeks to explore the difference in political influence between these large and small 
states in the UNSC. And acknowledges that small states do not have the same agency as 
larger states in world politics, and thus influence and engage world politics differently.  
This council of fifteen members has five permanent members China, the Russian 
Federation, the United States of America, France and the United Kingdom who have 
vetoing power. The ten remaining seats in the UNSC switch around, with each state 
elected by the General Assembly to serve a two-year term without being able to be re-
elected the term afterwards. The ten non-permanent members are currently: Bolivia, 
Egypt, Ethiopia, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Senegal, Sweden, Ukraine and Uruguay.   
Building off of the failed League of Nations, the UN was created in an effort to 
maintain peace, political stability as well as pursuing humanitarian efforts to protect 
human life.  It sought to be a more expansive and inclusive organisation than its 
predecessor. To this day, the majority of states in the world is part of the UN and sees 
an equal amount of recognition and voting power within the General Assembly. The UN 
serves a variety of purposes, but this paper’s focus lies in the interactions between 
states in the Security Council. 
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 This is because often when it comes to observing political processes in the UN, 
the focus switches to the Security Council, and is centred on the behaviour of vetoing 
powers during UNSC proceedings. The Security Council has the unique position of being 
able to act with international authority in the creations of peacekeeping missions. 
Which is why the Security Council is such an interesting actor to watch, specifically the 
powerful vetoing powers exposing their interests. The UN says the following about the 
Security Council:  
“The Security Council is perhaps best known to the general public as the principal organ 
responsible under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and 
security. In carrying out this critically important mandate, the Security Council, which according to the 
Charter must be able to meet at any time if circumstances so require, has adopted over 2,000 resolutions 
relating to conflict and post-conflict situations around the globe. Since 1946, the Council has mandated the 
deployment of over 60 peacekeeping mission. These peacekeeping missions have played an important role 
in maintaining lines of separation between combatants, facilitating peace agreements, and the protection 
of civilians. The Security Council has also developed and refined the use of non-military measures including 
arms embargoes, travel bans, and restrictions to guard against the exploitation of natural resources to 
fuel conflicts, as well as taking a lead role in the coordination of international counter-terrorism efforts.”1 
 
 When reviewing the UN’s stance and inner design of the Security Council, it 
becomes apparent that they are very convinced that UNSC efforts are the best current 
solution to solving conflict. As the UNSC can adopt many different strategies, in the form 
of mandates, in order to solve conflicts. The importance of peacekeeping as part of the 
                                                        
1 UN, Working Methods Handbook, (2011). 
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UN charter might lead one to argue that peacekeeping is the sole purpose of the UN. 
And when looking at the unequal distribution of state power in the UNSC, with the 
considerable power the UNSC has as compared to the General Assembly, that does not 
seem too strange. Furthermore, the focus on the UNSC is also due to the vetoing 
powers being considered to be amongst the most powerful states in the world. 
Therefore, the interaction between them can say a lot about the type of relationship 
they have, but also about the type of state they are or want to be, and the type of policy 
decisions they make because of that. As decisions between these powerful states can 
have a high impact, like the Cold War.  
But there is a lack of focus on the other predominantly smaller states, which is 
what this thesis focuses on more specifically. The agency of, predominantly small, 
nation-states that do not have UNSC vetoing power is interesting because their 
influence is subtler. Their influence goes beyond only the UNSC needing their vote for 
resolutions to pass through. This thesis seeks to explore the other means of influence 
small states have in the UNSC that are separate from just military or economic prowess. 
This thesis aims to provide some insight in this type of influence, and will pursue 
answering the question: What is the agency of small states in their pursuit to influence 
the Security Council? Agency, in this instance, referring to the political capacity of state 
actors to make independent choices benefiting their interests.  
 
The reason the Security Council is specifically examined is because the UN as a 
whole fulfils many roles, with many different branches fulfilling those different roles. In 
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these branches, there is often an equal distribution of power amongst the states. But 
the vetoing powers are often seen as the ones controlling the majority of efforts in the 
UNSC. Partially because their vetoing power, but also because they either have large 
militaries or are responsible for a large part of the UN budget.  
Because the UNSC predominantly occupies itself with peacekeeping, a contested 
issue, the peacekeeping effort relies heavily on the alignment of the vetoing-powers 
interests. It is not at all surprising that the vetoing powers gain all the attention; as 
disputes between them sometimes exacerbate situations such as in Syria. Or because 
one of the vetoing powers bends the rules, like Russia with their invasion of Crimea and 
Georgia, or the USA with their invasion in Iraq. It is hard to ignore their political 
movements, as they are such large states and have such an important role in the UNSC.  
 In order to give non-permanent members of the UNSC a means of influence, the 
membership of the non-permanent members shifts, with the membership shifting 
within a region based on a pattern. As of 1963, the elected non-permanent members 
are elected based on the following pattern: Five from African and Asian States, one from 
Eastern European States, two from Latin American States, two from West European and 
other States.2 Which ensures that the membership is not only within one region, adding 
additional perspective IN UNSC proceedings which makes the UNSC more than just 
about the five vetoing powers regional interests. 
Unfortunately, from my experience in the field of International Studies, a field 
that prides itself on perspective, there is a lack of focus on the agency, influence and 
                                                        
2 UN Chapter 5, Article 23, amended 1963. 
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power in the UNSC by non-permanent members and non-members. It seems that it is 
forgotten that, although the other UNSC members do not have vetoing power, for a 
resolution to pass through the UNSC there are 9 affirmative votes needed which gives 
the non-permanent non-vetoing states some bargaining power. Besides their vote, 
these members are also involved in the structure and organisational matters of the 
UNSC and UN.  These types of influence are subtle but there is insight to be gained from 
understanding the less obvious smaller state influence. 
As said before, the UNSC non-permanent membership changes. And although 
there have been 60 United Nations Member States that have never been UNSC 
members, they can still exert influence in the UNSC by means of UN regulations. 
Because according to UN Charter Article 31: “Any Member of the United Nations which 
is not a member of the Security Council may participate, without vote, in the discussion 
of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the latter considers that 
the interests of that Member are specially affected.”3 And UN Charter article 32:  
“Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council or any state 
which is not a Member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the 
Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute. The 
Security Council shall lay down such conditions as it deems just for the participation of a state which is not 
a Member of the United Nations.”4 
 This basic tenant of the UN charter is often overlooked, leading to the train of 
thought that the UNSC and its endeavours is something that occurs only between the 
                                                        
3 UN Chapter 5, Article 31, 1945. 
4 UN Chapter 5, Article 32, 1945. 
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five permanent members. These two articles essentially allow states to be invited to join 
meetings if they have a specific expertise, or if there is a specific interest at stake. 
Perhaps it is overlooked because the non-permanent members experience varying 
degrees of development as states, or because they are not very large in territorial size, 
military power or economic prowess.  Quantitatively, most states often come short in 
comparison to the vetoing five. And thus, we see that there is indeed a focus leading to 
research and attention being heavily dominated by quantitative notions.5 
 In the literature review the focus of quantitative notions, sometimes described 
as hard power, will be discussed as it is hard to ignore the influence large economies 
and militaries have. In order to properly answer the research question regarding small 
state agency, there is a case study that will be centred on the Nordic region. This case 
study serves as an example of influence through qualitative notions. Which can also be 
described as soft power, and although all the Nordic states all operated slightly 
differently in their pursuit of peace they do so predominantly by influencing through 
less obvious channels. It is important to note these states are not very representative of 
how the rest of small states exert influence, and rather serve as an example of small 
state agency.  
This thesis will show how small Nordic states pursue influencing the UNSC and 
why this type of influence is relevant. Another important thing to mention is that this 
thesis predominantly considers the Security Council and the influence of small states 
                                                        
5 Thorrallsson, (2012), 135. 
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within it. Although the literature review examines small states in a larger scale, with 
various discussions narrowing it down to the UNSC.  
In the literature review, there is a discussion and overview on similar research 
done in the field of small state agency. There is also some consideration for theoretical 
ideas that might provide some insight into the different ways small states exert their 
influence and why it is relevant. Theory dictates how people act, and what they pursue. 
The literature goes beyond the predominant International Relations (IR) theory because 
it is hard to account for the exertion of influence by small states in these theories 
because their quest for power is dissimilar.  
Following the literature review is the main argument, and as part of the 
argument there is a brief case study. This case study will discuss the agency, and 
influence, of the different Nordic states and considers their effectiveness and 
contributions to the UNSC from a theoretical perspective. Following this will be the 
conclusion, where the findings of this thesis will be discussed as well as magnifying their 
implications. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
 In this literature review, the goal is to provide some depth to this thesis by 
looking at various literature that has been written on the agency of small states, and the 
different shapes that agency takes. It will also include a discussion of IR theory, and in 
which ways IR theory is able to account or not account for the influence of small states. 
In the introduction, one of the arguments that serves as a foundation for this thesis was 
a lack of focus on small states in International Relations, which is something that is 
brought up by several authors. This lack of focus on small states might be attributed to 
the idea of quantitative notions being of greater importance in state power and 
prowess. 
Both the media as well as IR as an academic study often focuses on quantitative 
factors to determine the power of a state. State power, in the media, often linked to 
economic efforts in terms of GDP, but that is not a perfect way to measure progress.6 If 
economic factors are not the largest consideration, state power is then often considered 
in military capacity, territorial size and population.7 When considering the world in such 
ways, small states are significanlty more vulnerable politically and might appear or be 
weak in their capacity to exert influence in world affairs.8   
                                                        
6 GDP: An imperfect measure of progress, 2013. 
7 Archer and Nugent, (2002) 1-10. 
8 Thorhallson, (2012), 135-136. 
 10 
 Trying to classify and categorize states to determine them more or less powerful 
is problematic. Vast differences between states often mean that states have high 
potential in certain areas, but lack in others. This does not change the fact that a 
country with a strong economy or military can afford to make certain political moves 
that states weak in those areas cannot. Although in turn that does not mean nothing 
can be done by small states, or that nothing meaningful can be achieved from trying to 
understand them. Understanding the potential and political influence of small states 
should be a consideration, as small states are the majority of states in the world.   
 Historically small states have not had a lot of success with their recognition. In 
the League of Nations, the small states Liechtenstein, San Marino and Monaco were 
unsuccessful in their efforts to join as full members. These states were regarded as 
being too small, and were deemed to be incapable of conducting foreign diplomacy 
independent of their neighbouring states.9 Instead, these states were offered 
alternative types of membership: associated membership; limited participation 
membership; and represented membership.10 Which none chose to pursue because 
these types of membership severely limited their independent representation.  
Although those three states are considered microstates, a similar problem 
occurred during the decolonisation period in the midst of the Cold War. As there was 
considerable debate within the UN if they should offer new members, in particular small 
states, the same type of membership or membership that has an alternative form.11 In 
                                                        
9 Schwebel, (1973), 108-116, as found in Thorhallson, (2012), 144. 
10 Duursma, (1996), as found in Thorhallson, (2012), 144. 
11 Thorhallson, (2012), 144-145. 
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the end the UN did not go through with this because it would have meant altering the 
UN charter, which would have questioned the UN principle of sovereignty and equal 
sovereignty of all states.12 Microstates have still shown commitment to certain states, 
preferring their foreign affair interests, such as Monaco being obliged to consider the 
political, economic and military interests of France.13 Microstates bring to the table the 
issue of small states quite well, but they are often too limited in their political options 
and are often committed to certain states and the interests of those states. Operating 
based on comparative advantage is a necessity for microstates, and thus committing to 
certain states provides them more options to do so.  
 
 Neuann and Gstöhl, in their working paper, narrow down their justification for 
the study of small states to four justifications as they are especially relevant to the 
context of IR. Their first justification being that the great majority of the world’s 
sovereign states are considered small. The second has to do with one of the often-used 
basic assumptions in IR, which is that states that possess powerful capabilities will 
inevitably use them thus making them the more interesting ones to watch.14  
 Neuann and Gstöhl acknowledge that their second justification is only relevant in 
the case that one assumes that states do not feel bound by responsibility and 
international norms on the use of force.15 Which is an assumption that ties closely to 
                                                        
12 Duursma, (1996), as found in Thorhallson, (2012), 145. 
13 Thorhallson, (2012), 145. 
14 Neuann and Gstöhl, (2004), 2. 
15 Ibid 
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realism, being one of the three dominant IR theories. Their third justification is more of 
an institutionalist point of view; which is that great powers are the ones who control the 
international system, shaping international institutions according to their interests.16  
This justification in many ways accurately reflects the current balance of powers, 
which is an argument even further enhanced when one considers that in today’s world a 
lot of states will take into consideration what the interests of the great powers are in 
their decision-making processes. States that are members of alliances, such as NATO, 
consider the interest of the USA in their security assessments. Although one can argue 
over the degree to which states consider the interest of great power, it is certainly even 
more the case with micro-states like Liechtenstein or Monaco.  
 Their fourth justification is that international institutions and policies may be 
investigated not only as the outcome of great-power bargaining, but in terms of the 
relation between actors.17 While focusing on great powers is interesting due to their 
actions being very visible and in the public eye. But when one considers small states the 
fact that international institutions are very beneficial to small states, especially since 
they are the majority of the currently existing states, should show that there is a lot of 
places to influence. The relationships between states, big or small, in the current system 
has a lot of potential to influence policy. But is overlooked, perhaps because of historic 
precedence. Despite the fact that powerful states have used organizations during the 
Cold War as a way to manage alliances and their own state power and ideology. 
                                                        
16 Neuann and Gstöhl, (2004), 2. 
17 Ibid 
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  Historically, in the formation of European states, there has always been a notion 
of great powers. With the dominant grouping of the greater powers in the days of the 
Congress of Vienna to be considered Great Britain, Prussia, Russia and the Habsburg 
Empire, although France also eventually secured a place.18 It was the formation of those 
dominant groupings that led to those states meeting to discuss concerns and draw up 
agreements and treaties.19 During the formation of great powers idea, it was true that 
there certainly in the EU there were not very many states that could contend in any way 
with the power they possessed.  
As time passed by, some small states evolved to be defined as states that were 
neither great powers nor referred to as middle powers. Middle powers essentially being 
either regionally dominant states, such as Brazil, South Africa or India that might be 
large in territory but are not comparable to great powers in economic, military or 
industrial strength. Small states have always been defined by what they are not, rather 
than looking at the strengths they possess.20 Despite that small states such as 
Switzerland have considerable impact in finance, and states such as Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait influence the oil sector giving them a very specific economic influence.21  
Unfortunately, often it seems that the interest in small states in IR is either on 
microstates and how they seem to maintain some independence and differentiate 
politically from their neighbours.22 Or on how small states survive amongst the bigger 
                                                        
18 Neuann and Gstöhl, (2004), 3. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid, 4. 
21 Ibid, 5. 
22 Ibid, 6 
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powers, and what sort of alignment policy options they have or they should take and 
what kind of effects or long-term results these will yield.23  
The article Neuann and Gstöhl wrote shows that there is much to be gained from 
taking a much broader stance and trying to consider the international political system as 
a game that is being played by all states in a different way. The problem with the study 
of small states is that often the people that study it are from small states, which is 
certainly true for some articles that are part of this paper.  This problem limits the 
amount of research done on the topic, as some might disregard their writings as 
something biased. But studies like Anthropology can be extremely interesting in its 
research of a specific tribe in a specific isolated area, or Sociology in its study of some 
specific social behaviour. It seems illogical that an academic discipline that considers 
international world politics rarely considers the types of influence a small state can have 
despite there being so many small states. 
 
 Taking a broader look at what specific role small states can play in international 
politics and organisations, Vandenbosch uses the same base for his argument that states 
are categorised based on their power. He acknowledges the fact that it is hard to 
delineate how exactly theories can be applied to determine what makes a state a great 
power, because obviously size alone is not the only determining factor.24 A country such 
as Saudi Arabia currently has a lot of influence due to the reliance on oil. But while Saudi 
                                                        
23 Neuann and Gstöhl, (2004), 8. 
24 Vandenbosch, (1964), 293.  
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Arabia is relatively small territorially one might argue it has more political relevance 
than a larger state with an upcoming economy like Brazil. A state like the USA, for 
example, does not often consider Brazil in its political movements but certainly 
considers what effect their decisions have on their relationship with oil economies like 
Saudi Arabia.  
 Like Neuann and Gstöhl, Vandenbosch points out the unfortunate position of 
small states leading up to and following the Congress of Vienna. As the congress saw the 
rearrangement of Europe by the great powers with the restoration of empires; the 
partition of Poland, re-uniting Belgium with the Netherlands, neutralising Switzerland 
(as in making neutral, not making ineffective through sabotage), it saw the creation of 
the German confederation and determined some rules of international law with respect 
to the free navigation of rivers, the rank of diplomatic representatives and the 
dissolution of slave trading.25  
This combination of great powers was relatively successful at maintaining peace 
despite internal problems. Their frequent intervention in the internal affairs of states led 
to a cessation of rampant conflict, and the two big conflicts that occurred stayed in their 
region.26 In the end, it was unsuccessful and eventually the disagreements led to the 
First World War. But in a way, it could be considered an even earlier version of the 
League of Nations, or UN, that only contained ‘powerful’ states. As states evolved to 
                                                        
25 The Equality of States in International Law, Edwin D. Dickinson, (1920), 295. as 
written in Vandenbosch, (1964), 295. 
26 Vandenbosch, (1964), 295-296. 
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become more ‘powerful’ they were invited, and thus membership was given to France 
and Italy at later stages.27 
 When one considers this historical European precedent for intervention in state 
affairs perhaps it isn’t surprising that the EU would eventually be founded as a way for 
the smaller European states to band together.  The EU attempts to create a unified 
Europe that shares similar values but also tries to respect the individuality of European 
cultures. Perhaps the EU can be considered a relatively successful international in this 
way with its shifting leadership responsibility.  
Vandenbosch brought to my attention the fact that Europe has had a lot of 
practice in maintaining a region by sharing responsibility having done so since the 
nineteenth century with the Congress of Vienna. But comparing the EU and the UN is 
quite different, as the EU does not play a peacekeeping role, leaving that to its individual 
states to decide on their policy and potential participation. It does, however, provide 
some interesting insight in how smaller states (as compared to Germany, France or the 
U.K) have more influence.  
 Another interesting thought is the idea of economics as part of IR, as economic 
power is often seen as an important factor in certain IR theory. In a world where states 
have become economically interdependent, it should be noted that they have also taken 
consumer/producer roles. Vandenbosch points out that a state like Luxembourg does 
not waste its resources on security, because it can never compare or compete with a 
state like Germany. So, Luxembourg focuses on its strength, and sees a high standard of 
                                                        
27 Vandenbosch, (1964), 295. 
 17 
living.28  Some argue that means small states somehow possess higher or nobler 
qualities, which is doing themselves injustice despite it being a practice that is often 
seen in the UN. Small states have claimed that they are guardians of justice, are less 
selfish, more peaceful and more democratic than great powers.29 This argument is 
almost as strange as powerful states claiming they are the freest in the world. State size 
does not affect morality, or peacefulness. Canada is very large and very peaceful, and 
the small states Israel and Palestine have been at conflict for prolonged period. 
 The UN, as an organisation, is built to give small states a rise in their position of 
influence, with the intention of giving every state the same power in the general 
assembly. With the latter seeing such a high number of small states that they have 
overwhelming power in the general assembly. But while their influential power has 
grown, the larger powers have only continued to grow further. The Cold War was a 
testament to great powers providing an umbrella of security for small states. Although it 
also saw the great powers forcing these smaller states into subordination. In a way, this 
has only changed from the USA and Russia to predominantly the UN providing, or 
attempting to provide, a safety umbrella.  
While small states previously had no voice in security, because they often did not 
develop a large military power, the Security Council provides them with the opportunity 
to solve problems that might affect them or are affecting under-represented smaller 
states. Although some might question the UN and the framework it has provided, 
                                                        
28 Vandenbosch, (1964), 301. 
29 Ibid, 302. 
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Vandenbosch writes something in his conclusion about the UN that strikes very true 
today with our world becoming more and more inclusive.   
“The world can no longer get on without it even if in many respects it functions poorly. It is a great boon 
for the small states. It enables them to play a part in world politics out of all proportion to their 
population, economic or military strength. They will not easily give this up; they will wish to see the 
United Nations a strong, going concern, for that enhances their political influence in the world 
immeasurably. Nor can the great powers afford to see it disappear. For one thing, it serves them as "a 
mechanism for dis-embarrassment and disentanglement" from dangerous situations. In spite of their 
greatly superior military and economic strength the big powers cannot as members of the world 
community set them-selves above or disregard the views of the overwhelming majority of states.”30 
 
 Thorhallson, in many ways, serves as a sort of foundation for this thesis due to 
his broad overview on the subject of small-state means of influence in the UNSC. He 
acknowledges the focus on the permanent members of the Security Council, their 
vetoing power putting them in a much stronger political position.31 Which is something 
you could critique the UN for, although that would ignore that the UN was created by 
the victors of World War II who sought to create a system where they had the power to 
make sure something like a world war that devastating and terrible would not happen 
again. 
 Thorhallson researches the means of influence of small states based on his 
argument that there is a lack of focus on the small UN members, which he attributes to 
                                                        
30 Vandenbosch, (1964), 312. 
31 Thorhallson, (2012), 135-136. 
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the focus on quantitative factors that make up a state.32 That is not to say that there is 
not any attention given to small states or qualitative factors. Thorhallson shows that in 
the literature on small state influence, qualitative variables do indeed receive some 
attention when trying to explain their influence. Summarizing various authors 
Thorhallson writes the following on qualitative variables: “variables include small states 
as norm entrepreneurs, the image and perception of domestic and international actors, 
the aims and priorities of state leaders, and the administrative competence associated 
with small states central bureaucracy.”33 Which Thorhallson argues contradicts 
traditional IR theories, which have a tendency to reduce explanations of power and 
action to economic or military variables only.34 
Perhaps that is why it would be better to see state influence as something that 
takes place in “a specific spatio-temporal context that is not a general characteristic of 
the state — that is, a state may be weak in one relation but powerful in another”.35 
Unfortunately, most IR theory is preoccupied with big material and military power, and 
does not often consider specific characteristics of states in various scenarios. IR 
theories, and the UN, focus on quantitative variables, and how states match up that 
way.  
This preoccupation is something that states also consider, and it is quite logical 
to question how a state like Japan is equal to Luxembourg in political power and 
                                                        
32 Thorhallson, (2012), 135-136. 
33 Ibid, 139. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
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influence. Small states have had to fight for their equal membership in order to have 
equal ability in influencing the UN. But the UN does provide them with the capacity to 
influence, it is up to the small states to make the most of that capacity. 
Thorhallson determines that there are two broad categories of qualitative 
factors that governs the ability of small states to influence the UNSC:  
“the first is administrative competence in areas such as knowledge, initiative, and diplomatic, 
coalition and leadership skills; the second is the image of the state in the international system, with 
specific regard to its perceived neutrality or reputation as a norm entrepreneur in particular policy 
fields.”36 
Thorhallson clarifies the flaw of quantitative factors, but the administrative 
competence he describes is highly dependent on having an infrastructural capacity that 
allows for a state to develop such competence. Which seems to boil down to having the 
economic infrastructure that allows for a state to build those capacities. His second 
factor refers to the image of the state, consisting of its reputation and perceived 
neutrality in the subjects it discusses in. This, again, seems to favour a certain set of 
states more than others.  
Historically, the current state-system favours the history of European states as it 
was the system created in Europe that became a foundation for the current one.  The 
Westphalian system serves as a basis for current international law. Thus, a country that 
has had a long standing historical notion of neutrality, like Switzerland, is considered of 
“higher” reputation than a country that does not have such a long-standing historic 
                                                        
36 Thorhallson, (2012), 159.  
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precedence. Which, besides perhaps the Vatican, is seemingly the only example that 
could fit his second factor.  
Reading Thorhallson’s article it becomes quite clear that qualitative factors are 
hard to measure, which is why it might indeed be better to look at states compared in 
specific context. For example, in a specific context, Jamaica is better than the USA, 
because despite all the USA’s sports programs they still do not have an athlete who is 
faster than Usain Bolt. Although this example is unrelated to world politics, it shows that 
comparing states only based on factors such as military or economic would not do states 
that excel in something very particular any justice.  
 
Interestingly enough, Thorhallson points out a factor by looking at Keohane and 
Nye, although he does not consider it a factor. He mentions that the UN provides small 
states with plenty of opportunity to cooperate, forge alliances and lobby for their 
particular interests.37 Indeed, the rise of regionalism since the end of WWII has certainly 
allowed for states to band together to push a combined agenda, and adopt a similar 
stance in various facets of state building in order to try and thrive as a region.  
More specifically, on the topic of cooperation on security and peacekeeping by 
the UN and regional organisations, Hette and Söderbaum mention that the current view 
is that the UN is dominant and delegates tasks to regional organisations. Which 
essentially makes regional actors intermediate actors, with the purpose of contributing 
                                                        
37 Keohane and Nye, (1971), 329-349. 
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to a multilateral system that is controlled by the UNSC veto powers.38 This was the 
system that developed during the aftermath of WWII, which also saw the creation of 
organisations such as the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the Central American Common Market, NATO, the 
Warsaw Pact, Nordic Council etc.39   
The problem with the UN in that regard is that it is an organisation based around 
seeing states as a unified entity in order to achieve political progress. The UN aims to be 
a world entity, interfering with issues around the world as it sees fit. Overall as an 
organisation the UN has set their goal on the improvement of the world as a whole 
rather than improving the world for the betterment of one specific state. The Secretary 
General serves a representative for the organisation, rather than a representative for 
their state interest. The UN is an organisation that makes decisions on how to improve 
the world, which is very different than the decision-making process states or regional 
organisations normally make. For regional organisations, their internal organisation 
usually means that they account for the individuality of states more so than the UN does 
but they tend to only focus on a portion of the world.  
 But for most states, their political system usually means that they make 
decisions based on a portion of the population. State governments often have to prove 
to the population that their vote for that government was important, so they often 
make political decisions based on a system that prefers a less intensive investment 
                                                        
38 Hettne and Söderbaum, (2006), 227. 
39 Fawcett, (2003), 9-11. 
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leading to short-term benefits that might come with long term loss; rather than an 
initially intensive investment leading to long term benefits that comes with initial short-
term loss but no long-term losses. Think of practices such as fracking, or not wanting to 
move away from non-renewable energy. 
This is not to say that states do not try to achieve the efforts they set claimed to 
be willing pursue in the UN, it just seems that it is taking states a longer time to move 
towards such necessities because they want to maximise their profits and losses. Which 
comes back to material factors once again. Powerful states can act more independently 
in this matter, pursuing short term benefits because they are able to. Small states that 
cannot immediately grasp short term benefits because they are not powerful enough to 
adjust their policies and budgets so easily. With climate change, for instance, large 
states such as the USA do not follow climate pacts because they are in a position of 
power where they can choose to neglect their responsibilities (free riding), and so they 
do not see the same level of progress that states such as Germany or some other 
European countries have.  
New regionalism moves away from the UN dominance idea, and sees more 
power being put into regional treaties alongside regional organisations. The UN has 
been called upon by, and has called upon, various regional organisations to play 
complimentary roles in peacekeeping related affairs, as happened in Mali for example.40 
While the UNSC still needs to approve regional intervention, regional organisations and 
alliances make up for the small sphere of influence small states have. Although, with 
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current events such as Brexit it brings into question how much states still believe in the 
power of regional organisations. Although the historic notion of sharing a seat on the 
Security Council, most recently proposed by the Netherlands and Italy, shows that 
certain states are still very much committed in showing their alliances and their 
willingness to cooperate.41 
In Africa, there is some evidence of their continued belief in regionalism with 
their infamous creed: African solutions to African problems. African states are large in 
territory, but their development is varied, which is why they try to combine their efforts 
in order to solve conflict. The economic community of West African States (ECOWAS) is 
a good example of a regional organisation that has sought to become more involved in 
regional cooperative efforts on peacekeeping. As part of the peacekeeping mission in 
Mali, ECOWAS was amongst the first actors to respond to the growing conflict.  
Although ECOWAS damaged its reputation during their involvement in Liberia, 
preferring one side over the other in the conflict.42 They attempted peacekeeping again 
during the conflict in Mali, and although they did not possess the resources necessary to 
make an initial difference, they did get the African Union (AU) and the UN involved.43 It 
was the combined efforts of the UN, ECOWAS, AU and France that led to the somewhat 
successful mission in Mali. Mali, and the involvement of ECOWAS, serves as an example 
of regional cooperation on peacekeeping issues. Showing another factor that states can 
make use of in order to influence the UNSC. These types of regional cooperative efforts 
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show that small states have some agency in this way, by combining their specialities and 
power they were able to address certain problems that the UN was not.  
Although there are also examples of states pursuing their own agenda in and 
through peacekeeping. In an article written by Tarp and Hansen there is a wide overview 
of the importance of small states. There are numerous chapters addressing various 
political scenarios, outlining different political manners small states can influence. In the 
chapter on security-related affairs, they mention that due to the rise of the 
responsibility to protect the international community has seen a group of aligned 
countries, operating predominantly outside the Security Council, lead a sustained 
campaign to use that responsibility to intervene when the necessary criteria are met.44 
The focus of this thesis is predominantly on the UNSC, but as mentioned earlier 
in the literature review I felt it was necessary to take a broad perspective when 
considering means of influence. This is because this allows one to include various 
manners in which small states can move forward in their UNSC influence or 
peacekeeping agenda(s). Examples of this success are the effective campaigns against 
anti-personnel landmines and cluster ammunition during the 1990s and the more recent 
development of the Arms Trade Treaty. 45 A notable achievement when one considers 
the fact that several of the veto-holding powers of the SC were the most prominent 
producers of the weapons that this treaty sought to ban. 
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The Nordic states have been highly influential in the Security Council as it is a 
reputation they built up through their efforts in the Cold War. For example, Denmark 
was predominantly occupied with expanding upon an institution focused to aid 
peacekeeping/building efforts. Pursuing that agenda during their seat on the Security 
Council, and their continued efforts after their membership ended, led Denmark to 
establish the Peacebuilding Commission as well as an accompanying Peacebuilding 
Fund, and a UN office dedicated to advancing the peacebuilding agenda; the 
Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO).46 Denmark, due to their historic successes reaps 
the benefits of their enhanced reputation despite contributing less to the peacebuilding 
fund than other Nordic countries.47 
An important facet of the UN that people often forget is that it is made to be 
inclusive, but therefore it also has a decision-making process that is lengthy. Earlier in 
the literature review this was brought to the attention when contrasting state decision 
making as compared to organisational or UN decision making. While that is something 
obvious, it means that observing UN outcomes is often not immediately discernible. The 
UN was, from my point of view, made with the intention of longevity. While it has flaws, 
it tries to overcome them by allowing for a longstanding open conversation to take 
place between all states. Taking a look at goals the UN sets for itself, that becomes even 
more apparent especially when you consider goals such as the UN Development Goals 
which is a global cooperative effort to develop the world in a proper manner. 
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Tarp and Hansen write of the various ways a country like Denmark has 
influenced international decision-making by leveraging its neutral reputation and 
experience, with environmental challenges for example. The globalisation of the world 
has made states more susceptible to various opinions, which differ widely depending on 
the issue at hand. Rather than the previous north vs south, or developing vs aiding 
countries. The UN, despite all its issues, has contributed to globalization and the 
establishment of a diplomatic forum for all states.   
Tarp and Hansen point out that Denmark, as a small state, has continued to build 
off this UN ideology of familiarization by forming alliances;  their cooperation with 
Tanzania led to the establishment of the UN peacebuilding commission; Denmark has 
also cooperated with South Korea in order to promote green growth, and set up a 
Global Green Growth Forum to promote global public-private partnerships focused on 
accelerating the speed and scale of the transition to a global green economy with 
Mexico; and has been cooperating with other European states in order to forge alliances 
for progressive third world countries in order to bring value based ideas such as 
women’s rights as well as sexual and reproductive health/rights to the discussion 
table.48 
Furthermore, influencing institutional priorities or the operational practices of 
UN funds, agencies, and programs is also a way for small states to pursue a foreign 
policy agenda. Tarp and Hansen argue that for small states such as Denmark 
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international organisations give them the opportunity to engage with the developing 
world. In regards to security, they point out, doing so by re-orienting the inner 
mechanisms of the UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery by identifying its 
comparative advantages and then adjusting its strategic priorities correspondingly.49 
Which is a good example of how leveraging bureaucratic processes allows a state to 
have influential political influence. Although these examples relate more to UN 
influence than to UNSC influence.  
There are some who disagree with the influence of a state like Denmark 
however. The argument being that Denmark has supported UN peacekeeping since 
1948 because of national interests. Although that could also be said about the 
permanent UNSC members. UN peacekeeping was a way for Denmark to support NATO 
allies without angering the US, and thus found a way into Denmark’s foreign policy 
identity.50 It allowed a small country like Denmark to promote their interests and values. 
Denmark’s interest only further rose in the 1960s as Danish decision-makers realized 
that it provided an efficient and low-cost way of augmenting Denmark’s international 
prestige and influence.51 
Although that makes Denmark seem rather selfish, a small state does have to 
weigh its costs and their benefits in a different way than large states. This might be why, 
as Jakobson argues,  when the UN handed over responsibility for the Balkan peace 
operation to NATO it shifted Denmark’s perspective to see UN operations as less 
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attractive. Denmark started prioritising NATO and US led operations. The Danish 
frustrations at the failing peacekeeping mechanism became apparent with the atrocities 
committed in Eastern Europe and Africa.52 Denmark moved away from their altruistic 
mentality, and instead moved towards a warrior mentality with their participation of 
NATO in the Balkans as well as their involvement in the Middle-East post-9/11.  
Which either shows that Danish decision makers do indeed follow the path that 
generates the most power, prestige, peace and pride from their point of view. Or that 
they follow the greater powers, and adjust to the system these greater powers create. 
Denmark will likely continue to take the path of enabling actors that can provide a 
critical difference.53 This type of strategy allows Denmark to work with its strengths, and 
mitigate their small-state weaknesses. 
The “toolbox of small states” Tarn and Hansen write of is an insightful 
explanation. It indicates how small states can influence political processes, using 
different political tools. The first tool is input, which are activities aimed at influencing 
the ways implement their mandate in terms of their planning, prioritisation and 
strategizing. For example, by organising meetings on specific issues, or financing studies 
on academic studies. The second tool is operations, being used to influence organisation 
operation such as budgeting, processing, recruitment, resourcing and value. By, for 
example, monitoring and evaluating missions, or creating a place for dialogue on 
performance and mission priorities. And lastly, responding is a tool that allows one to 
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influence through building alliances or having expertise. For example, by having a 
specific expertise a state can be invited to the UNSC in order to provide insight on a 
specific problem in order to achieve the best result. 54 
 Maria do Céu Pinto also explores small state peacekeeping/building influence 
with her examination of Portuguese peacekeeping involvement. Portugal is a small 
country, and played a largely uninvolved role in the UN during the Cold War. But during 
the 1990s the Portuguese participation increased rapidly, with Portugal taking the 
position 26 in the ranking of countries contributing forces to UN peacekeeping 
operations.55 Although in 2012 its ranking had dropped to 43 out of 115 contributing 
countries, having an average of 720 soldiers deployed outside national territory and 
25,000 since the 1990s.56  
Their lack of involvement in the latter years is mainly due to the financial crisis, 
which put Portugal in a position of financial challenges limiting the efforts of their 
peacekeeping.57 Do Céu Pinto continues her explanation of Portuguese involvement 
through a constructivist lens, with Portugal’s national interests transforming due to their 
increased participation in international organizations which led to the Portuguese 
identification with the collective values of the UN.58 Portugal, rather than trying to work 
against the system created in the UN, sought to maximise its interests by cooperating 
with states, that share mutual interests, within the multilateral organisations it is part 
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of.59 Constructivism provides an interesting theoretical perspective in this sense, which 
Do Céu Pinto prefers over the other theories for a specific reason.  
Constructivism lends itself to looking at small states, and their means of influence, 
because each state has essentially created a world view that is different from other 
states. In that view of the world, they try to pursue their agenda as best as they can in 
order to enrich their country. Considering realism, however, entails that the view of the 
world is rather limited and is centred around power politics. It does not account for 
small-state influence. Realism, with its various branches, is built around the propositions 
or tenants: States are the predominant actors in international politics rather than 
individuals or international organisations; the international political system is anarchic, 
because the lack of a supranational authority that can enforce order over the states; 
actors in the international political system are rational as their actions maximise their 
own self-interests; all states desire power so that they can safeguard their self-
preservation.60 
If one would only consider the world in a realist perspective, then there would 
be gaps in the explanation for certain events. Thomas Risse-Kappen points out that the 
structural theories of IR lack approaches that integrate domestic politics, transnational 
relations and the role of ideas, knowledge, values and concepts.61 Considering those 
approaches allows one to account for changes beyond military or economic ones. 
Considering the Soviet Union (SU), Brooks and Wohlforth point out that material 
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pressure definitely shaped SU policy pushing it in a certain direction, but only 
contributing that policy shift to materialistic changes would do injustice to the 
ideological shift that had taken place in Russia.62  
Realism takes a perspective that is too narrow to be able to consider factors such 
as the influence of a person such as Mikhail Gorbachev or someone like Nelson Mandela 
or even Ghandi. While these people are not all actors in world politics, their ideas 
shaped the course of certain states. Although only considering the importance of ideas 
as part of constructivism is not enough. As Risse-Kappen states: “The role and impact of 
ideas should be conceptualised as intervening variables between structural conditions, 
and the definition of actor’s interests and preferences.”63 Constructivism “assumes 
actors and structures mutually constitute each other; anarchy must be interpreted to 
have meaning; state interests are part of the process of identity construction; power is 
both material and discursive; and change in world politics is both possible and 
difficult”.64 Which essentially boils down to all states have the power to change world 
politics, and that individual state actions have meaning despite their appearance. 
Liberalism, on the other hand, is built around three very different principles: the 
rejection of power politics as the only possible result of international relations; 
highlighting the potential of mutual beneficial relationships and international 
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cooperation; implementation of international organisations and non-governmental 
actors to help shape state preferences and policy choices.65  
Liberalism is built around the belief that with the correct international 
institutions, and through increasing interdependence, states have the opportunity to 
reduce conflict.  Interdependence consisting of three factors: states interact in various 
ways through economic, social, and cultural means; security tends to not be the primary 
goal in state state interactions; and military forces are not typically used.66 According to 
Liberalism, international diplomacy is a discourse option that can effectively promote 
interaction between states with the goal to ensure non-violent solutions are prioritized. 
The potential for cooperation is much greater in the theory of Liberalism, as compared 
to Realism. 
The cooperation that is possible under Liberalism allows one to see that states 
have come to act as part of, or act through, international organisations. According to 
Abbott and Snidal, formal international organisations have been prominent 
participations in many critical episodes in international politics. Their article, albeit 
written in the 1990s, shows the growing power of international organisations. Examples 
being the UNSC sanctions on Libya, any UNSC intervention for that matter, or the 
involvement of the International Atomic Energy Agency and its inspections in North 
Korea are good examples of the power and involvement of international organisations.67  
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There are many more examples of the importance and influence of international 
organisations. The World Health Organisation (WHO) helps form global health policies, 
NATO helps form European security prioritisation, with the EU aligning all members in 
more areas than just security, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concerns itself 
with the management of international monetary policy and the World Bank occupies 
itself with economic capital developmental efforts.68 Participation in such organisations 
also appears to reduce the likelihood of violent conflict among member states.69 
Abbott and Snidal continue to argue how certain IR theory is compatible with 
international organisations, and in what way. They go on to explain how they use a 
predominantly rationalist theoretical perspective to highlight the importance of formal 
international organisations. Rationalist theory acknowledges the importance of formal 
international organisations, and recognises that they have a place in the world.70 
Although having a sort of supra-national world government would not be feasible under 
realism.71 Realism argues that current organisations like the UN are built with 
considerable flaws and are not capable of curbing powerful states. These types of flaws 
lead to the UN not being able to fulfil its role, as was the case in Rwanda.  
The role of small states, and international organisations, is thus perhaps best 
understood through a synthesis of the rationalist and constructivist approach. Which 
would, according to Abbot and Snidal, explain that “states consciously use international 
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organisations both to reduce transaction costs in the narrow sense and, more broadly, 
to create information, ideas, norms and expectations; to carry out and encourage 
specific activities; to legitimate or delegitimise particular ideas and practices; and to 
enhance their capacities and power. International organisations, considering these 
functions, serve as agents with these roles giving these organisations considerable 
influence well beyond simple material power.”72 
For small states, the rise in power of organisations gives them additional 
influence. In the world-economy, for example, large states often influence the inner-
workings of the economy more than small states do. But the creation of organisations 
such as the World Bank or the IMF, has given small states a podium to voice their 
opinions. Although measuring their influence in such organisations, and what type of 
policy they generate through their input, is something else entirely. Through their 
involvement in international organisations small states have the capability to influence 
decision-making processes. This in turn allows them to influence decision-making 
processes elsewhere such as the UNSC. It also is a way for small states to show interest, 
and build up their reputation of being an involved state that concerns itself with worldly 
affairs rather than just their own. As mentioned before, the image of a state can be very 
influential as it allows states to improve their capacity to influence, which enhances 
their agency.  
As mentioned, in IR, there is a strongly held belief by some academics and 
diplomats that it is only the vetoing powers that are worthy of being studied. The 
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conventional wisdom about decision-making inside the Security Council shows that the 
five great powers with veto powers, and permanent memberships, in the Security 
Council leave the ten other members with virtually no influence over that body’s 
decisions. Formal models of decision-making in the Security Council suggest that the five 
permanent members of the Security Council monopolise almost all voting power.73  
 Formal models yield the insight that “the bargaining power of the non-veto 
members is effectively null.”74 Empirical studies harmonize with this assessment and 
define the Council as an exclusive pact between great powers.75 The conventional 
wisdom about the dominating role of the Council’s five permanent members serves as 
motivation for recent studies: such as Stojek and Tir who posit that “clearly P5 states 
have a hold on Security Council decision-making and their interests ultimately drive the 
outcomes in the Security Council.”76 
There are other researches that concur, saying that previous research has shown 
the base that work of the UNSC is shaped by the interest and preferences of the five 
permanent members. Some diplomats who served on the Security Council agree that 
the great powers on the Security Council - its five permanent members - all but 
monopolise control of this body. Mahbubani, who represented Singapore on the Council 
in 2001 and 2002, describes the ten non-permanent members of the Council as being at 
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an extreme structural disadvantage in the body’s deliberations and decision-making 
processes. 77  
The intention of this literature review was to provide some insight in order to 
make one consider that the Security Council is about more than just the five vetoing 
powers. And that the deliberations made in the Security Council can be influenced by 
smaller states through individual or collective efforts made through various channels. 
The fact that their influence isn’t solely military or economical does not diminish their 
influence, nor does it mean that they are morally superior.  
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Chapter 3: What to learn from small states 
 
So far, this thesis has tried to shed some light on what other people have written 
on the subject of small states and their means of influence in the international political 
level. This somewhat broad perspective was then narrowed down at different types of 
influence small states can have in the UN, or in international organisations. The 
literature review tried to emphasise the many different ways that one can observe a 
state and the means of influence certain states have. It is, therefore, almost impossible 
to assess which method is most effective. However, that does not mean that different, 
perhaps subtler, means of influence should be considered being less important. 
The literature review started with an article that addressed the set of 
assumptions that influences why small states are often neglected. Which proved, in 
another article to have some historic precedence because the historic process leading to 
the creation of states has always seen some sort of categorisation based on state 
power. Although this type of categorisation was more prominent in Europe historically, 
their Westphalian history has influenced the UN. And there was discussion about type of 
membership these states should have. In the end, the categorisation was limited in the 
UN, with only the vetoing powers being a different case in the UNSC. But there is still 
often a measure of power based on quantitative factors as a way to categorise states. 
In the literature review another aim was to move away from the dominant focus 
on quantitative factors, to show the actual, and potential, power of small states. 
Considering small state power in a specific context really allows a small state to shine in 
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its strongest aspects. Combining that idea with an IR theory that accounts for the power 
of ideas, the setting of norms, regulations, and ethical standards allows one to see the 
influence small states have. Or the type of influence they spread through regional 
alliances, such as the EU or the non-alignment movement. But this type of theory or 
perspective is often overlooked due to the imbalance of power in the UNSC.  
The UN exercising its rights as dominant international organisation, which we 
have come to see relies heavily on its five vetoing powers, rather than regional 
cooperative efforts, in order to achieve peace. But there has been a shift. New 
regionalism moves ever so slightly away from the UN as the dominant actor, with a 
more substantial role being passed along to small states, which might allow them to 
carry more political bargaining power in the UN as well as outside it. Although that is 
not to say that small states need a sort of regional cooperative framework in order to 
operate. States like Portugal have been very successful in influencing peacekeeping 
policy. Portugal due to its increased participation, which is the result of Portuguese 
political dedication to providing peace and security, has played a highly involved role in 
peacekeeping and UNSC operations in the 1990s. 
In IR theory, small states are often unaccounted for because certain IR theories 
states that one should view the world, and its politics, as something predominantly 
about power and so states are constantly in conflict over said power. Realism, for 
instance, does not account the power of international organisations or the influence 
that certain ideas or people can have. Realism sees the world as anarchic, and thus 
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world politics is always in conflict. Which is a sort of law of the jungle, where only the 
most powerful states survive because they are the ones with the capacity to do so.  
Whereas liberalism does the opposite, arguing that international organisations 
allow for greater cooperation that creates interdependence and interdependence leads 
to a decrease in conflict. Which has certainly shown to be true, to some degree, as the 
number of international organisations has grown exponentially since WWII. 
Constructivism allows one to consider politics as an interaction between all states 
because it argues that international politics is a system made by all states agreeing and 
creating it to be the way it is. Having the power to have created something like that, also 
allows one to change it. It isn’t the consequence of human nature, or some political 
inevitability as other theories argue.  
Which is why this thesis will narrow the theory down further, as one of the 
articles argued. A combination of theories probably best accounts for small state 
influence. Taking on rationalism, for instance, means that one recognises the 
importance of international organisations, and their potential, but sees that creating a 
supranational government based on the idea that the UN is relatively successful is not 
ideal or feasible. Which is because it is hard to create something that can overcome the 
shortcomings of the UN. It has been discussed to change the Security Council, and its 
vetoing powers, but part of the reason these five states created it was because they 
were the victors of WWII and wanted and needed a system that benefited them and the 
way they considered the world.  
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This is why perhaps a synthesis of rationalism and constructivism thus best 
accounts for the theoretical narrative and perspective this thesis takes. This synthesis of 
constructivism and rationalism creates a theory that explains why states consciously use 
international organisations to reduce transaction costs, but also to create ideas, norms, 
expectations and alliances in order to improve their capacities, power and political 
agenda. This is not to say that they only have selfish pursuits, rather it allows for one to 
consider all states as individual entities that are capable of their own decision-making 
following their own agenda. Whether they achieve that agenda, or in which way they 
pursue it, is not relevant in this case. Acknowledging them as individual states, capable 
of making some change or influencing some decision, is.  
In this next part of this paper, there will be a brief examination of some Nordic 
countries. These countries share a similar culture, and history but have taken different 
routes to influence UNSC and peacekeeping decision-making. As mentioned in the 
literature review, the Nordic countries, generally, have a positive reputation that is 
associated with neutral, peaceful and prosperous. This paper will continue by examining 
Danish, Swedish, Finish and Norwegian means of influence, specifically looking at 
peacekeeping ideology and the influence these states have had on peacekeeping. As this 
is, arguably, the best way to demonstrate how one can influence the UNSC by 
influencing one of the tools the UNSC uses.   
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Chapter 3.1: Nordic influence in the UNSC  
 
When looking at the Nordic type of influence, which was particularly noticeable 
during the Cold War, the easiest way to understand their agency in the UNSC would be 
by looking at it from a constructivist/rationalist perspective as mentioned in the 
literature review. These theories essentially explain that states use international 
organisations, as well as their own reputation, to influence specific activities by either 
encouraging, legitimising or delegitimising particular ideas and practices. This type of 
power, the power of persuasion and influence, is also called soft power. Which is very 
contrary to the hard power of economic or military might. But yet, in the Cold War, it 
was predominantly soft power that played such an important role for small states. 
Jakobson argues that the Nordic model of peacekeeping was, during the Cold 
War, considered a model exemplifying the spirit of traditional UN peacekeeping: “A 
peacekeeping based on the principles of impartiality, consent and the non-use of force 
except self-defence.”78 During the Cold War, the Nordic Standby Forces Manual was 
seen as the basis for establishing and training UN contingents.79 Western powers turned 
to the Nordic countries for advice on how to approach peace operations. Unfortunately, 
the UN and its priorities changed during the early 1990s which diminished Nordic 
influence in UNSC peacekeeping operations.80 
                                                        
78 Jakobson, (2006), 381. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
 43 
The success of the Nordic countries cannot be overlooked, but it was very 
specific to the Cold War. Jakobson explains that for states to qualify in order to 
contribute to U.N peacekeeping during the Cold War, they had to meet four 
conditions.81 
“First, with rare exceptions such as the UK in Cyprus, permanent members of the Security Council 
could not contribute troops – to avoid local conflicts becoming part of the superpower confrontation. 
Second, a potential contributor could not come from the region in which the conflict was taking place nor 
be thought to have a special interest in the conflict at hand. Third, it had to be acceptable to the host 
government. Fourth, a contributor had to be able to provide units at short notice that were capable of 
defusing conflicts peacefully without the use of force.”82 
The Nordic countries fulfilled all conditions; they were too small to pose a threat 
and had no special political or economic interest. As these states were seemingly more 
interested in their political image. Their colonial history is not often mentioned, as it is 
incomparable in size to the British empire which most colonial history seems focused 
on.83 Because their colonial history is overlooked, combined with their small size they 
are not presumed of having an imperial design.   
The four states had also established a record of active involvement in the 
previous League of Nations to solve dispute peacefully. Sweden and Finland remained, 
mostly, neutral during WWII. They were also effective in providing trained and equipped 
troops with a peacekeeping mindset.84 This peacekeeping mindset is something that the 
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police forces of these Nordic countries also embody. In Norway, for example, the police 
haven’t killed a person in the last ten years and having only fired two shots, without any 
casualties, in the year 2014.85 
As mentioned in the literature review, national interests definitely played an 
important role in establishing the role of Nordic countries in peacekeeping. For example, 
Denmark as a state switched from their peacekeeping ideology to a more military role.  
Changing their priorities, as they became part of NATO, and following U.S ideals rather 
than seeking peace as its predominant focus. The Cold War led Denmark and Norway to 
balance deterrence and reassurance as part of their NATO membership.86  
Finland was put in the position of demonstrating that they were capable of 
maintaining a genuinely neutral position between the SU and the West without arousing 
suspicion on either side. Finland became convinced that peacekeeping allowed it to 
truly show its neutrality by trying to aid multiple countries. Their position as a neutral 
state was to be defended as a type of mentality that was not merely to save their own 
skin, but is a mentality that could serve the higher interests of the international 
community due to Finland’s neutrality.87 
Sweden sought to pursue a policy in the UN that silenced critics of a neutral 
policy, similar to Finland. Wanting to be actively involved in the UN because they 
wanted to demonstrate the credibility of neutral politics, which they believed would be 
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judged primarily according to how it contributed to the construction of a new system of 
peaceful international relations.88  
The changes the end of the Cold War brought with it destroyed the niche that 
Nordic countries, and other like-minded states could operate in. Permanent members of 
the UNSC could now claim a more direct part in peace operations in places they had a 
special interest. Plus, as Jakobson shows, the shortcomings of the UN in Rwanda and 
Bosnia saw the need to change the mandates to allow a more forceful response. This 
made it hard for Nordic states to maintain their status and influence as a major troop 
contributor. The Cold War provided a framework that allowed for the effective use of 
Nordic peacekeeping forces, but also allowed them to successfully work with a 
framework based on their ideology.89 
A resurgence of high Nordic influence is certainly possible. However, the small 
Nordic states need to find their niche again, which I believe applies to small states as a 
whole as well. The Nordic influenced the UNSC by being a model for the peacekeeping 
ideology that was most prominent during at the time. They are also an example of how 
small states can influence the UNSC. But the end of the Cold War shook up the UNSC, 
meaning the Nordic states had to adjust. New regionalism has been part of that 
adjustment, seeing great powers cooperating with organizations that are largely 
compromised of small states. This resurgence of regionalism has seen small states 
obtain more influence, autonomy and prestige as compared to the Cold War.  
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It is pointed out by Jakobson that integrated civil-military and multidisciplinary 
civilian force packages deployable at short notice could be a potential area where the 
Nordic countries can shine.90 Getting civilian experts deployed in the right spot at the 
right time in the right numbers is still an international problem. Nordic states have that 
capacity to make an impact as they have high administrative competence; civilian law 
and order teams, civilian administration teams, and police mission leadership teams are 
all examples of Nordic prowess.91 Perhaps their combined efforts could indeed make it 
possible to develop fundamental niche packages in short supply.92  
Nordic countries have been making this difference in the EU, playing a leading 
role in pushing the process forward to develop those capacities.93 Further coordination 
between Nordic states could significantly influence their political bargaining power in 
the UNSC. Especially because the Nordic states share a similar cultural, historical and 
educational background. Nordic states have seen a lot of invitations in the UNSC due to 
their expertise in civilian and military related affairs.94 If they could combine their efforts 
in order to pursue a joint Nordic civilian capacity, being able to deploy civil-military force 
packages at short notice, they might be able to take a larger role befitting more 
influence in the UNSC due providing something that is hard to successfully provide.  
Small states do not necessarily have to be at the forefront of every mission or 
UNSC effort, but as was mentioned in the literature review, creating a reputation that 
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others respect is something that is beneficial. This is why the Nordic countries have 
more options than just civil-military force. In diplomacy, there are always many roles 
that a state outside the conflict can pursue in order to resolve or aide. The Nordic states 
already have a positive imago, which is why besides only deploying forces they can focus 
on using the reputation they have, or once had, in order to mediate more actively. They 
also have often had a seat at the table in the UNSC, being invited often in order to share 
their expertise. Having a seat at the table is already a type of influence as well.  
 Besides their positive imago, and being invited to share expertise, the Nordic 
states have taken the role of third-party mediator in past peacekeeping missions. As in 
the Cold War, that type of neutrality was advantageous. Lethi and Saarinen point out 
that an active third-party role as mediator or a facilitator widens the scope of traditional 
state diplomacy.95 Traditional state diplomacy and traditional IR does not account for 
the potential of small states in this sense.  
Third party activity in conflicts has been part of traditional diplomacy as long as 
there has been modern diplomacy but in a classic setting third party has participated in 
crisis management, for example, with military intervention and with guaranteeing peace 
treaties but type of third party has been great power activity.96 Small states adopt a 
weaker form of third party diplomacy and act merely as a facilitator that offers its 
services not as an active broker, but as a discreet presence with certain human and 
material resources to offer as a state only seeking to resolve the situation.97 
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Third-party mediating was something that was more common for the Nordic 
countries during the Cold War. Whereas large states are currently more capable of 
fulfilling those roles since the end of the Cold War. Small state influence and diplomacy 
has not waned, rather it has changed. Sweden, for instance, was a significant 
contributor to the UN General Assembly unanimously adopting its first resolution on 
conflict prevention in 2002.98 Sweden has, since their involvement in Macedonia, seen 
significant incentives to integrate conflict prevention into their country’s foreign 
policy.99 The UN has given Sweden a platform where prominent Swedes can engage in 
preventative diplomacy and conflict prevention: Jan Eliasson becoming, for instance, 
one of the persons assigned by the UN to various peace related missions, such as the UN 
mediation between Iran/ Iraq, as well as being a special UN envoy during 2007/2008 in 
Darfur in order to try and mediate.100 
Lethi and Saarinen point out that Swedish policy for the twenty-first century 
consists of strengthening UN prevention capability. Sweden, together with likeminded 
states such as Canada, Denmark and the Netherlands, contributed to the creation of an 
informal Group of Friends for Conflict Prevention of the Secretary-General.101 Sweden 
also promoted the creation of a permanent fact-finding mechanism, supported the UN 
trust fund for preventive action, and cooperated extensively with the UN department of 
Political Affairs and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.102  
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Norway is sometimes criticized for their involvement in Sri Lanka as mediator, 
which was not all that successful. But the civil war in Sri Lanka has shown that a 
resolution will take a lot of effort, and that perhaps it is a type of effort smaller states 
should approach differently. In Sri Lanka, there was a return to the battlefield after a 
long period of different ceasefires between the government and the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam. The ceasefire implemented by Norway certainly saved a lot of lives, 
significantly improving living conditions for the people on the island.103 But it, 
unfortunately, wasn’t enough in order to end the conflict completely. There were a 
number of factors influencing the Norwegian engagement in Sri Lanka, which can be 
found at three different levels according to Höglund and Svensson:” the readiness of the 
mediator; the acceptance of the primary parties; and the consent of the regional and 
global powers.” Norway was willing to engage as a mediator in this conflict because of 
their ambition to function as a peacemaker.”104  
They were chosen by the international community because of the approval of 
the other powers not wanting to have more influential actors in Sri Lanka. A problem 
with the Norwegian campaign was that their approach was built on impartiality, 
whereas in Sri Lanka it was difficult to uphold that image of impartiality due to the 
asymmetrical setting of the conflict.105 The Norwegian mission serves as a good example 
that influence does not necessarily have to be positive. The Norwegian endeavour to 
mediate such a problematic conflict is important, because with the international war on 
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terror the focus has shifted. During the Cold War peacekeeping was more focused on 
peacekeeping it seems, which sounds strange.  
It was during that time that the focus seemed to be on helping the newly 
founded countries around the world come to terms with their place in the world. 
Perhaps it was residual colonial influencers, trying to retain some influence. Or it was 
the Cold War mentality that drove them to want to make sure ideologically the country 
would not become communist or capitalist. Allowing them some freedom of choice in 
their fate. Now it seems that certain states try and use the UNSC missions as a sort of 
excuse to meddle in other states affairs. With small states supporting these efforts 
because at least it allows them some degree of influence. In any regard, the UNSC 
seemed to operate on a very different level during the Cold War. Which is 
understandable, but one has to realise that it has had significant impact on the way that 
states currently operate and why they choose to do so. 
While some might argue about this, the Cold War was essentially from 1947 until 
1991. It was during these 44 years that the Nordic Countries had the ability to get used 
to the system and the rules that the UN had created in order to become properly 
influential in it. I would argue that their influence was much more noticeable then, 
because the niche that existed that limited the vetoing powers allowed these neutral 
small states to thrive and spread their ideology. Since the ending of the Cold War, the 
past 26 years have seen a change in the UNSC, which has changed the type of influence 
these small states have. As mentioned in the literature review, small states take longer 
to move their resources into different directions. This is why Denmark and Norway 
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changed their approach, as aligning with the USA through NATO seemed to be in their 
best interest as it allowed them a type of influence. 
The Cold War had very specific boundaries, but the world has changed to 
become a place where there is seemingly more discord within the vetoing powers than 
before. Perhaps this is my own bias, as I did not live during the Cold War and thus have 
only read about it. From my perspective however, in current world politics, China for 
instance is being more confrontational, although it is a very subtle change as compared 
to the Russian type of confrontations in Georgia or Crimea.  
The focus in the UNSC centres around the vetoing powers, and they have 
become even more active in this area since the end of the Cold War. This meant that 
small states have started banding together more in order to form fronts of influence 
against the five political UNSC powerhouses. And although their efforts are not always 
predominantly focused on influencing the UNSC, their efforts do allow them to 
influence.  
New Regionalism is a good example of this influence however. As it moves away 
from great power politics, or the UN being the predominant actor, with regional 
organisations becoming more powerful. These organizations are trying to create 
solutions to problems quicker than the UN could. After all, the UN regards the entire 
world as having a voice when it addresses issues. A regional organisation can mobilise 
quicker, and should arguably, be able to respond to problems that occur in the region at 
a faster pace with a better understanding of the conflict than a state halfway across the 
world does. Mali was a good example of the AU and ECOWAS responding the 
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international conflict. Their response was followed by French involvement, as requested 
by Mali. As well as the UN responding and making it an official UN peacekeeping 
mission.  
Nordic influence in the UNSC could thus be described as the influence of 
initiative. As peacekeeping evolved during the Cold War, states such as the Nordic ones 
stood out due to their reputation and work ethic. The quantitative factors that 
Thorhallson mentioned, being administrative competencies and state image/reputation, 
are areas the Nordic states shine brightly. And although they each faced different 
problems due to different political moves they made, they all showed initiative and 
interest in the UNSC, and UN, because they saw that as a way to increase their prestige. 
While that image might have been damaged after instances such as Sri Lanka, or 
alliances with NATO or the former SU, the Nordic countries still see a high number of 
invitations in the UNSC in order to share their insight. And as mentioned before, being 
able to sit at the table is an influence in and of itself. Peacekeeping in the Cold War has, 
from my perspective, been one of the definitive factors contributing to the amount of 
influence Nordic countries have in UNSC decision making currently.  
 Early on in the literature review, it is mentioned state influence should be seen 
according to “a specific spatio-temporal context that is not a general characteristic of 
the state — that is, a state may be weak in one relation but powerful in another”.106 
Bringing it back to theory of power, small states are often weak when compared to hard 
power of big states like the UNSC vetoing powers. This was mentioned in the literature 
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review as well, and this is the reason that small states often specialize in other 
endeavours that stand outside categorical hard power.  
 In soft power, it is where small states are often equally or more powerful than 
powerful states, because it is often very specific. While it is somewhat of a cliché, the 
size of large powers makes it so that their actions are incredibly noticeable and thus it 
makes subtle influencing more difficult to notice. When there are issues of nuclear 
weapons involved, or chemical weapons, often the first response to the problem is a 
military one. In the UNSC it functions quite similarly, the small states have to use all the 
tools in their influence toolbox in order to make some sort of impact on political 
deliberations. Especially when the issue at hand are issues involving powers they do not 
possess. Their soft power is certainly less noticeable, but still very present. Small states 
have to operate in a niche, and have to find that niche. New Regionalism has given small 
states an opportunity to form a power block that allows them to operate and pursue 
influence in the UNSC by acting in a manner that is positive but also respects the process 
of the UNSC. This type of power block is very noticeable in the General Assembly, where 
these small states all have a vote.  
 Considering the participation of the small Nordic States, particularly during the 
Cold War, their agency becomes quite clear, as they most certainly have played a large 
part in the framework that has been built to support peacekeeping missions as well as 
having influenced significantly through their expertise in certain areas. While these 
states are all relatively successful, seeing a high standard of living, the shift in world 
politics towards regional organisational power is giving these small states the 
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opportunity to operate in a more influential manner. While there are not very many 
states that choose to operate predominantly in peacekeeping, there are quite a few 
good couple examples of small states that have significantly influenced. The Nordic 
states are a clear example of that, but also Bangladesh for its high manpower it sends to 
peacekeeping missions. Or Portugal, which increased its participation post-Cold War as 
peacekeeping missions started becoming more common.107 But because all these states 
operate in a slightly different way by using soft power that is specific to the type of 
influence they think they specialize in it is hard to keep track of. 
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Chapter 4: Conclusion 
 
If one thing should be clear from this thesis it is that states should not be lumped 
together when considering agency or influence. Each state influences differently and 
operates in a slightly different way. That is why constructivism leans itself towards this 
thesis, but also rationalist thought because it shows that states work together to 
minimize cost and maximize benefits. Because these states are small, they have to 
deliberate where they spend their resources. Deliberations on how to spend resources 
is a process very different for each state. Not each state is occupied with power, but 
rather are occupied with surviving as a state being true to their culture, political 
ideology or the people they represent.  
 Political process and influence simply takes time. Looking back at the Cold War, 
we can say that the Nordic states have been successful in their endeavours to influence 
the UNSC and put forth a peacekeeping ideology that saved human life. The end of the 
Cold War brought about big changes, and while the large states took some time to 
adopt they have in the last ten years been quite active in peacekeeping missions. 
Furthermore, the fact that the amount of peacekeeping missions has exponentially 
increased since the end of the Cold War should indicate the increased amount of UNSC 
involvement in world politics. 
The five vetoing powers have taken up the mantle of trying to protect the world 
since the end of the Cold War, this seems apparent. But conflicts, like the one in Mali, 
show that they are making way for other state organisations to influence. These types of 
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cooperative efforts expand outside just the EU or AU or NATO. The Nordic states have 
contributed to building a framework of organisations that monitor and aid 
peacekeeping missions as part of the UNSC, often cooperating with likeminded states 
across the globe in order to do so. Compared to how the division of states was 
compared to the congress in Vienna, small states have gained a lot more agency 
through their increased participation.  
 But because they are competing in a world where military and economic power 
still makes a large difference, their subtler soft power approaches usually fly under the 
radar because they are not as ostentatious as using nuclear weaponry is. The recent 
changes in the U.S presidency might also see that the European states will operate their 
security priorities differently, as the U.S through NATO has been a large contributor to 
their military strength. Perhaps this type of change will lead to a very different type of 
influence in a few years. But one thing seems clear; small states will, seemingly, always 
operate in the waves that the bigger states leave but perhaps they know that is where 
they can catch the most fish.   
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